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This is the final report  under Contract NASw- 1666 for the NASA Office 
of Bioscience Programs conducted by Exotech Incorporated over a nine month 
period from August 9, 1967 to May 9, 1968. The study encompassed the fol- 
lowing two areas of effort: (1) the conduct of a planning study for an organic 
constituents inventory program; and, (2) provision of technical support to the 
Planetary Quarantine Office in the preparation of technical manuals and speci- 
fications pertaining to the implementation of quarantine requirements. 
The principal activity under this contract was the planning study on the 
organic constituents inventory for materials of earth origin deposited on the 
Moon in the course of lunar exploration. In view of the extent of this effort, 
and to facilitate NASA use in  assessing the needs for an inventory program, 
this work is summarized in the separate report  enclosed herewith (Exotech 
Incorporated report  No. TRSR- 68- 029). 
Technical support on specifications and manuals was provided to the 
Planetary Quarantine Office in the course of this program in response to 
specific needs. The principal activities in this task a rea  a re  summarized in 
the following appendices and enclosures to this report: 
Appendix A: Determination of Microbial Exposure Probabilities 
Appendix B: Feasibility of Estimating Microbial Loads by 
Fracturing Sample Materials 
Enclosure: Paper by S .  Schalkowshy, L. B. Hal l  and R. C. 
Kline titled "Potential Effects of Recent Findings 
on Spacecraft Sterilization Requirements", pre- 
sented at the 11th Plenary Meeting of the Committee 
on Space Research (COSPAR), May 14, 1968, 
Tokyo, Japan. 
The above paper covers work done under this contract and also under 
The latter Contract NASw-1558 for the NASA Office of Planetary Programs. 
work entailed the study of spacecraft equipment fracturing and associated 
microbial release probabilities and is intimately related to the  work done for 
the Planetary Quarantine Office under this contract. 
Samuel Schalkowsky served as Program Manager of and contributor to 
the studies reported herein. The planning study on the organic constituents 
inventory was conducted by Robert G. Lyle a s  Principal Investigator with 
support from Saul Honigstein in cost and management analysis, The technical 
studies summarized in Appendices A and B, and related analytical work, were 
conducted by Robert C. Kline with the support of Phillip Randolph. Contribu- 
tions by Dr. Robert R. V. Wiederkehr of Westat Research, Incorporated on a 
consulting basis are also acknowledged. 
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APPENDIX A 
DETERMINATION OF MICROBIAL EXPOSURE PROBABILITIES 
This effort consisted of formulating a mathematical model to characterize 
the probability that viable organisms, embedded within a given material, will be 
exposed when the material is fractured. 
The experimental data base used for testing the resulting model and esti- 
mating associated model parameters was provided by N. J. Peterson*. This data 
consists of observed proportions of fractured samples of a given material which 
yielded contamination when the surfaces exposed by fracture were subjected to 
an appropriate culture medium. Associated with each data point, i. e., each 
observed proportion of 20 fractured samples, are (1) the experimentally con- 
trolled surface area exposed by fracturing each sample and (2) the concentra- 
tion of viable organisms buried (embedded) within the sample material. 
Analysi.s of Peterson's experimental procedures led to an underlying 
hypothesis consisting of the following assumptions: 
1. Buried organisms are independently distributed within the interior 
of each sample volume of material. 
2. Each viable organism is equally likely to be located anywhere in  
the interior of the material within which i t  is buried. 
3. Fracturing of a material corresponds to exposure of the contents 
of a sub-volume of the total volume of material. 
On the basis of this hypothesis, the number, N, of organisms exposed by 
a fracture is distributed according to a Binomial distribution, i. e. the probability 
that k organisms are exposed is given by 
* Planetary Quarantine Unit, Phoenix Field Station Section, National 
Communicable Disease Center, U. S. Public Health Service, Phoenix, 
Arizona. . 
No - k 
P{N=k} = (To) (5) ( l - + )  
k = 0 , 1 , 2 , * * * ,  No 
where V denotes the total volume of the sample, V, denotes the sub-volume 
exposed by fracturing and No denotes the total number of organisms distributed 
within the sample interior. In particular, the probability, P(e), that a t  least one 
viable organism is exposed by fracture coincides with one minus the probability 
that no organisms are exposed, i. e., 
P ( ~ ) = ~ - P { N = o }  
For  specified surface area, A, , exposed by fracture, expression (2) can be 
rewritten as 
= 1-(1- x f, \NO 
where 
f = AJV = fracture ratio 
X =  V,/A, = exposure depth coefficient 
Expression (3) constitutes the model developed to characterize the chance of 
exposing viable organisms upon fracturing a volume, V, of material containing 
No organisms, assuming a surface area, A,, is exposed by the fracture. 
Representing the ratio of exposed volume to the total volume in terms of 
the fracture ratio provides several conveniences. In particular, the fracture 
ratio is a convenient measure of the magnitude of a fracture since it is the a rea  
exposed by fracture scaled by tlie total volume of material  under consideration. 
Moreover, it is expressed in  terms of well-defined numerical quantities whose 
values are, in .principle, readily determined. 
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The exposure depth coefficient, A, can be viewed as a model parameter 
whose value is determined, at least in  part, by (a) the material  which is k a c -  
tured, (b) the fracturing procedure, (c) the operational characterization of the 
exposed area, e. g. how surface roughness is accounted for i n  defining exposed 
area, (d) the "sizes" of organisms populating the material, and (e) the opera- 
tional definition of microbial exposure. The first three of these factors relate 
to unaccounted for irregularities present on the surface exposed by the fracture; 
in t?ks sense X can be assumed to absorb measurement e r r o r s  in the fracture 
ratio. The size of the organisms populating the material  can, i n  principle, affect 
the depth to which organisms can be cultured. The operational definition of 
microbial exposure is perhaps the most significant factor in the determination of 
1. For example, the depth to which organisms are cultured (exposed) by 
immersing the fractured material  in a culture medium should, in general, be 
greater than that determined by the residual material falling away (exposed) from 
the exposed surface. 
The former situation applies to Peterson's experiment wherein the empir- 
ically determined value of X turned out to be approximately 3 .5  microns. From 
the standpoint of releasing buried contamination from impacting spacecraft, the 
latter operational definition appears more appropriate. For this situation, a 
more reasonable value for X might be between one and two microns, the average 
diameter of microbial spores. 
'The model defined in  Expressions (2) and (3) can be viewed as  a special 
case of a more general model determined by the additional assumption that the 
total microbial load, No, is distributed according to a Poisson distribution 
function, i.e. 
k 
( C I A , )  e -CXA, (4) 
where C denotes the mean or  average concentration per unit volume. Under 
this assumption, Expression (2) coincides with P { N= k I No = m}, i.e. the 
conditional probability that k organisms a r e  exposed, given that the total volume 
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contains m organisms. In the case of exposure from an impacting spacecraft, 
where the buried load is a random variable, the assumption of a Poisson distri- 
bution is likely to be more appropriate. 
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APPENDIX B 
FEASIBILITY O F  ESTIMATING MICROBIAL LOADS 
BY FRACTURING SAMPLE MATERIALS 
A preliminary analysis has demonstrated the feasibility of obtaining accept- 
able estimates of microbial loads through the controlled fracturing of sample 
material. 
The experiment considered consists of fracturing a fixed number of samples 
noting the proportion of positives: i. e. , those which yield contamination. Based 
upon the observed proportion of positives, what, if anything can be said about the 
unknown microbial concen &a tion? W e  attempt to answer this question by sepa - 
rately considering three possibilities, viz: (1) - no positives a r e  observed; (2) - no 
negatives a r e  observed: and, (3) a t  least  one positive (but not all positives) is 
observed 
In the first case above, one is able to establish probabilistic bounds on the 
unknown load. For  example, if no positives a r e  observed in a sample of 5, then 
we can say that the unknown load is less than 600 with 95% assurance. Similarly, 
no positives in a sample of size 10 indicates h a t  the load is less than 300 with 
95% assurance. 
than 150 with 95% assurance. 
Finally, no positives in a sample of size 20 indicates a load less 
The second case  above is analogous to the first in that again, one is able to 
establish probabilistic bounds on the unknown load. 
a r e  observed in a sample of 5, then we can say that the unknown load is greater 
than 150 with 95% assurance; o r ,  if a l l  positives a r e  observed in a sample of 10, 
then we can say that the load is greater than 300 with 95% assurance. Lastly, all  
positives in a sample s ize  20 indicates a load grea te r  than 600 with 95% assurance. 
For  example, if al l  positives 
In the third case  above, one is able to actually estimate the unknown load 
and, in addition, provide probabilistic bounds on this estimate. 
assume a sample s ize  of 25. If 6 positives a r e  observed, then we have a t  least  
For  example, 
80% assurance that the unknown load is 275 f 140 organisms. 
positives a r e  observed, then we have a t  least  90% assurance that the unknown load 
Similarly, if 22 
is 2100 f 1050 organisms. In general, the range of e r r o r s  do not a l ter  the 
estimates a s  much a s  an order of magnitude. 
Although further study is warranted, the present analysis demonstrates 
the feasibility of controlled fracturing a s  a workable procedure for estimating 
microbial loads. The results presented above a r e  based upon a fixed fracture 
ratio of 1000; increased assurance may be possible using other fracture ratios. 
Further consideration should be given to the precision with which given fracture 
ratios can be attained and to the sensitivity of load estimates to e r r o r s  in fracture 
ratio measurements. The above analysis assumes each sample contains the same 
microbial concentration; a relaxing of this assumption should be included in future 
analyses . 
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Paper No. L. 2.5 
Presented to Open Meeting of Working Group V, at the 
11th Plenary Meeting of COSPAR, May 14, 1961, Tokyo, Japan 
POTENTIAL EFFECTS O F  RECENT FINDINGS 
ON SPACECRAFT STERILIZATION REQUIREMENTS 
S. Schalkowsky(2)*, L. B. Hall(') and R. C. Kline ( a *  
(1) National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Washington, D.C. , U. S. A. 
(2) Exotech Incorporated, Washington, D. C. , U. S. A. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The formula tion of sterilization requirements for planetary spacecraft is a 
continuing effort which must take into account pertinent new information a s  it becomes 
available and seek a realizable compromise between the prevention of planetary con- 
tamination and the impact of quarantine requirements on  the conduct of planetary 
missions. 
The process of specifying sterilization requirements encompasses numerous 
factors, many of which contain considerable uncertainty. A suitable analytical model 
o r  structure is necessary in order  that the various factors be properly weighed and 
their relative impact on requirements assessed. This paper summarizes the essential 
aspects of a n  extended analytical model, beyond that used in the past, to accomodate 
information which has  been developed in the past  year, o r  which is currently being 
evolved. The various factors currently receiving detailed attention a r e  discussed in 
this paper and their potential effects on spacecraft sterilization requirements 
assessed. 
This paper reflects some basic premises currently under consideration in the 
implementation of planetary quarantine constraints by the National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration of the United States. In particular, the use  of gaseous treatment 
*Work reported herein by Exotech Inc. authors has been supported under contract 
NASw-1558 with the NASA Office of Planetary Programs and under contract NASw-1666 
with the NASA Office of Biosciences. 
for  spores is viewed a s  an  effective decontaminant, but such treatment is not considered 
to provide adequate confidence in the destruction of all viable spores present. Similarly, 
emphasis is  placed herein on the evolution of dry heat sterilization requirements, reflec- 
ting a n  earlier choice of this method over radiation sterilization for spacecraft equip- 
ment. % 
2. MAJOR CONSIDERATIONS IN THE FORMULATION O F  
STERILIZATION REQUIREMENTS 
?he degree of r isk which should be accepted for planetary Contamination has  been 
the subject of discussion in the past. 
in the s imple  but adequate relationship (1,2) 
This aspect of the problem is readily summarized 
P, = N P(N) +N '  P(N') (1 1 
P, is the probability that the planet will be contaminated in the course of planetary 
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exploration and a value agreed upon for this parameter is P, = 1 x10 (1). N and N '  are ,  
respectively, the number of landing and non-landing spacecraft which a r e  expected to be 
flown during unmanned planetary exploration and P(N) and P(N') a r e  the respective 
Probabilities that any one landing o r  non-landing flight will cause planetary contamina- 
tion. Using a total number of flights of N+N' = 100 and allowing the contamination 
probabilities for landing and non-landing missions to be equal, i t  is readily found that the 
constraint on any one mission reduces to P(N) = P(N') 5 1 x 10 , i. e. the probability that -5 
-3  . any one planetary spacecraft will contaminate tlie planet should be 5 1 x 10 
paper, attention is focused on the requirement P(N) for landing missions since it is for 
these spacecraft that sterilization procedures become necessary. A s  demonstrated in 
-5 connection with planetary fly-by missions, the constraint of 1 x 10 
non-landing missions by taking precautionary measures in mission design without having 
to r e so r t  to spacecraft sterilization. 
In this 
can be met for 
One major a rea  of uncertainty is the probability P(g) of growth and spreading on 
Thus, assuming that a 
I 
the planet by microbial contamination of terrestrial  origin. 
viable terrestr ia l  organism has been deposited onto the planet surface, it is necessary to 
~ 
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assign a probability that it will grow and spread so a s  to bias future biological explo- 
ration of the planet. 
is essential to note that this probability refers to a single viable organism released 
onto the planet surface; the fact that the probability of planetary contamination is 
increased if more than one viable organism a r e  released is accounted for in the model. 
For  consistency with the analytical niodel to be used herein, it 
tt 
It can be shown that the ratio P(N)/P(g) approximately represents the mean 
number of viable microorganisms which can be released onto the planet surface by any 
one landing spacecraft. This ratio is denoted a s  n(r). If P(g) = 10 , a value currently 
-2 
considered a conservative assessment of the growth probability on Mars, then n(r) 5 10 . 
From the point of view of implementation, n(r) is the controlling planetary quarantine 
constraint. 
represents the number to be expected, on the average, over repeated trials. 
example, n = 1 x 10 implies that if a count was repeated 100 times, we would, on the 
average, expect to find only one organism during one of these counts and no organisms 
in the other 99 counts. ) 
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(The "mean" number, a s  used herein to characterize a microbial count, 
For  
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The major considerations which enter into the evolution of explicit sterilization 
requirements from the planetary quarantine constraint on n(r) a r e  summarized in 
Figure 1. Thus, the landing spacecraft is partitioned into discrete sources of contami- 
nation, classified in accordance with actual, physical subassemblies of the spacecraft. 
The constraint n(r) can therefore be viewed a s  being distributed amongst all of these 
subassemblies and the requirement is that the sum of the n, (r)  not exceed the con- 
straint  n(r) .  (The designation n, (r) refers to the contribution of the ith subassembly.) 
Within each subassembly a distinction is also made between the following three sources 
of biological contamination: (1) contamination located on open surfaces; (2) contamina- 
tion which has been occluded between mated surfaces; and, (3) that which is buried 
inside spacecraft materials. (In Figure 1 the subscript denotes the particular 
source under consideration and the superscripts s, "J6 identify the source a s  being either 
of the surface, mated o r  buried type. ) 
The above classification of sources emphasizes the fact that any one subassembly 
in the spacecraft can contain, and usually does contain, all  three types of contamination 
sources. The contribution of any one of these sources to the problem can be assessed in 
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terms of the major post-launch and pre-launch factors shown in Figure 1. 
pre-launch factors a r e  (1) the pre-sterilimtion microbial load a t  tlie various space- 
craft locations, categorized into surface, mated, o r  buried types, and (2) microbial 
Tie major 
resistance to sterilization for the three types of contamination. 
major post-launch fact& in Figure 1, a l l  but one of tlicse relate to the probability 
that viable organisms present in the spacecraft a t  launch will be released upon arr ival  
at the planet. The first two factors, i. e. spacecraft impact velocities and the probabil- 
ities that these impact velocities will occur, a r e  unrelated to the partitioning of the 
spacecraft into subassemblies o r  contamination sources. However, the other two 
release factors a r e  intimately related to this partitioning. 
microbial release caused by a crash landing from a particular source, it is necessary 
to h o w  to what degree the impact velocity is attenuated a t  this source. Similarly, the 
degree of equipment fracturing must be considered in terms of the physical and design 
characteristics associated with a particular contamination source. ?he last item noted 
in the post-launch category is the probability of microbial survival in transit and has to 
do with the effects of hard vacuum and ultraviolet radiation during flight to the planet. 
Referring to the 
Thus, in order to evaluate 
The major elements of a sterilization specification a r e  shown in the last block of 
Figure 1. To explicitly define these sterilization controls and procedures, and to do it 
in a manner which would meet the requisite planetary quarantine constraint, n (r), without 
unduly constraining mission implementation o r  unnecessarily dcgradiiig engineering and 
scientific mission success probabilities, it is necessary to quantitatively account for all 
of the factors shown in Figure 1. 
In view of the above, effort is being applied to gain a better understanding of and, 
where possible, to quantify the major factors in the pre-launch and post-launch categories. 
In the sections which follow, pertinent aspects of these factors a r e  discussed a s  a pre- 
liminary step to the consideration of their potential effects on sterilization requirements. 
3. DISCUSSION 
In discussing the individual post and pre-launch factors, i t  will be relevant to 
establish the degree to which any one of them is either determinable o r  controllable. 
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The determinability of a factor depends upon how amellable it is to measurement and, 
also, on the degree of confidence which can be placcd upon the values measured o r  
estimated. 
important to establish the degree to which it is controllable, for it is often possible 
to confine a factor to below a value which would make it a significant irduence on thc 
sterilization requirements. 
Regardless, however, how well a factor can be determined, it is equally 
c. 
S M B  
3 .1  Initial Microbial Load - n i j  (0 )  
Progress made in assessing and quantifying the initial microbial load varies in 
accordance with the source category considered. Because of the availability of suitable 
experimental techniques , the accuniulation of microbial contamination on open surfaces 
is most readily assessed. Microbial load on mated sui-faces is, of course, die result  
of the occlusion of what was at a prior stage an open surface. Knowledge of contami- 
nation on open surfaces can therefore be transferred, to some degree, also to mated 
surfaces. However, a direct measurement of mated surface contamination is not 
readily made. The measurement of microbial loads contained within spacecraft 
materials is  least amenable to effective experimental procedures and reliable data in 
this category are therefore not available. 
Depending upon the size of the spacecraft and controls used in assembly and 
manufacturing, it is estimated that the microbial load on open surfaces would be in a 
range between 10 and 10 . A proportionate range could be applied to mated surfaces. 
Any estimate of the buried contamination would at  this time be largely speculative. 
However, a reasonable upper bound can be established in terms of microbial concentra- 
tion per  unit volume of material, depending upon the contamination present during 
manufacturing and heating o r  other sterilizing factors, which might be natural aspects 
of the manufacturing o r  quality assurance processes. 
4 7 
A recent development which may enhance the estiniation of buried contamination 
This work was oriented is associated with the experimental work by Peterson et a1 (3). 
towards the assessment of microbial release, o r  exposure, from fractured material, 
but it now appears feasible to reverse the statistical procedurcs used and, by fracturing- 
sample spacecraft materials and measuring growth on these fractured surfaces, to 
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obtain an estimate of the concentration of viable contamination in the materials. 
The initial load can be controlled o r  limited during final spacecraft assembly 
and to a lesser degree during subassembly. Control derives primarily from the use 
of clean-rooms and/o,r,decontamination procedures. During component manufacture, 
however, liiiiiting of the contamination load is not too practical. 
3.2  Microbial Resistance - DS’M’B 
The resistance of microorganisms to dry heat sterilization has been found to 
vary considerably depending upon whether the organisms a r e  contained within materials, 
between mated surfaces o r  on open surfaces. In terms of the logarithmic reduction time, 
i. e. the D-value, o r  tlie time required to reduce the population by one decade, the resis- 
tance on open surfaces is about 0.3 hours whereas spores in spacecraft materials have 
shown resistance a s  high a s  5 hours. On mated surfaces, microbial resistance ranges 
between 0.3 and about 4.4 hours, depending upon conditions of moisure-vapor transfer 
at the mated surface and the relative humidity prior to and during sterilization. 
It has been well established in the past few years that moisture plays a dominant 
role in determining the resistance of microorganisms to heat sterilization (4) (5). Further 
attention is currently being given to understanding the role of moisture in a way which will 
permit more effective control over sterilization procedures. This is  particularly relevant 
for mated surfaces, a s  it would be highly desirable to be able to characterize tliis type of 
microbial resistance towards the lower range of the D-values given above and thereby 
make them nearly equivalent to open surfaces. 
3.3  Spacecraft Impact Velocities - vh 
The velocity of the spacecraft upon arrival on the planet is critical to the con- 
sideration of microbial release from the spacecraft. Under nominal soft landing condi- 
tions, there can be microbial release from external surfaces but not from internal 
surfaces o r  from the inside of spacecraft materials. In general, it can be assumed that 
so long as  spacecraft landing is a t  nominal soft-landing velocities, spacecraft equipment 
will have been designed to operate a t  these velocities without breakup. 
Since hard impact velocities a r e  critical to the estimation of release probahilities, 
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it is not adequate to evaluate them in general terms. Specifically, it is necessary to 
establish tlie explicit events for a given planetary mission which would lead to non- 
nominal landing conditions and to assess the impact velocities, vh , associated with 
these events. As mission design progresses, the quantification of these velocities 
becomes a feasible task. 
3.4 Probabilities of Impact Velocities - P (vh) 
The explicit events which lead to impact velocities a r e  related to failure modes 
of. particular spacecraft equipments, e. g. , deviations from planned midcourse maneu- 
vers, failures in deorbit equipment, o r  failures in landing deceleration equipment such 
as parachutes. 
intimately related to the engjlieering reliability of spacecraft equipment and mission 
design. The probabilities of various impact velocities will thus be constrained for 
engineering reasons and the possibility of closer control for  quarantine purposes is 
available, a t  least in principle. 
The probability that a particular impact velocity will occur is therefore 
S,M, * 
3. 5 Attenuation of Spacecraft Velocities - yi 
As noted in Figure 1, the various release factors must be viewed in the context 
of discrete spacecraft subassemblies and particular sources of contamination within 
these subassemblies. It is therefore necessary to ascertain what additional effect may 
resul t  from the attenuation of spacecraft impact velocity a t  the source under consideration. 
In some instances, such a s  external structural pieces, this may not be too significant 
a consideration. However, some very fragile subassemblies within a functional element 
Of the spacecraft may have significant velocity attenuation by virtue of tlie physical path 
between this element and the point of spacecraft impact, Although a detailed quantification 
of velocity attenuation factors may be difficult, it may be possible to estimate them using 
well developed theory and empirical howledge on the shock resis'ance of structural 
elements in various configurations. The controllability of this factor can be similarly 
characterized, i. e. to the extent that techniques a r e  hiown which will increase impact 
resitance, they can be utilized in spacecraft design in appropriate circumstances. 
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3.6  Equipment Fracturing - f i  (vh . y: ) 
.In the case of mated and open surfaces, it is assumed that when a critical velocicy 
is reached, contanlination from these sources is released. However, in the case of 
buried contamination it is necessary to identify an additional event before actual release 
8 
from tlie inside of materials can occur. Specifically, for any assumed impact velocity, 
it is necessary to establish the degree to which the material will break up. This param- 
eter is identified herein as tlie fracture ratio, f ,  and is given by the ratio of area exposed 
i n  the course of impact to the original volume of material under consideration. To com- 
p k t e  the characterization of microbial release from materials, it is also necessary to 
consider a parameter noted herein and in reference (3) as the exposure depth coefficient, 
X. This coefficient can, for the present purposes, be viewed as the depth at the exposed 
surface to which a microorganism is considered physically free from the material and, 
therefore, released onto the planet surface. 
Peterson et a1 (3) has established experimentally the value of X to be about 3 
microns. In these experiments, the value of X represents, to some degree, the 
amount of penetration of the nutrient medium into the exposed surface. For the present 
purpose of considering physical release at  impact, it appears reasonable to assume that 
the value of X is of the order of the size of the microorganism, i. e. about 1p. Consid- 
ering the uncertainty in other parameters, it is of little consequence at present whether 
h is taken to be 1 o r  3 microns. 
Efforts are currently in progress to quantify fracture ratios for typical space- 
craft materials, based on information in  other areas where experimentation has been 
carr ied out. It is also possible to establish upper bounds on the value of the fracture 
ratio by assuming all of the energy at impact to go into producing fractured areas. * 
In general, the fracture ratio, f ,  would be proportional to the square of the 
impact velocity. To obtain some feel for the magnitudes of f ,  consider a solid cube of 
material about 1 ft. on each side. This volume of material would fracture into about 
260,000 pieces when the fracture ratio is about 1,200 l /m,  A fracture ratio on the 
"Conmibutions by Dr. William C. Cooley of Exotech Incorporated on obtaining upper 
bounds of f are gratefully acknowledged. 
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order of 10 implies pulverization of the material to micron size and represents a 
release probability of unity. 
3. 7 Probability of Microbial Survival in  Transit - g'PB(a) 
The effects of Gltraviolet radiation on microorganisms located on the exteriors 
of the spacecraft, and tlie effects of hard vacuum on other microbial contamination, 
have been considered in the past as possible causes of microbial destruction in transit. 
The effectiveness of ultraviolet radiation is limited by uncertainties on microbial 
exposure to this radiation. 
planetary space, some initial die- off has been observed in laboratory experimentation 
but the long- term effects have not been substantiated to make this a major destructive 
factor (6). 
As regards the destructive effects of vacuum in inter- 
4. ANALYTICAL MODEL 
Equation 2 below provides a basic framework for assessing the effect of the 
various factors discussed above on the development of spacecraft sterilization require- 
ments. 
P(N)/P(g) 2n(r) = 
The double summation in equation 2 reflects the need to partition the requirement, 
n (r) ,  into the various spacecraft subasseinblies and to consider within any one subas- 
sembly the dffcrent contamination sources. 
post- launch factors which i iduence the sterilization requirement. 
ably simple presentation, this paranietcr is formulated below under the simplifying 
assumption that the spacecraft will either land at tlie desired velocity, i. e. a soft landing, 
o r  else, there will be a single impact velocity denoted by vh.  
The parameter k summarizes all of the 
To permit a reason- 
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otlierwi se I O, 
-6  wliere = 10 m for f i J  inunits of l/m . 
S ,  M, 8 The velocities, vi 
contained at individual sources  will be released onto the planet surface. 
noted that release from surfaces and mated suriaces is taken to occur only i f  the space- 
craft impact velocity exceeds this critical velocity, as modificd by the attenuation factor 
for rhe source condsidered. 
, above represent critical velocities at wliich the contamination 
It is to be 
, P I ,  B The parameter P' (s) in equation 2 denotes the probability that any one micro- 
organism will survive sterilization of a specified duration. In the case of heat sterilization, 
PS* '.'> (s) could be represented by the corresponding D values, viz. 
T h e  DS' ''8' above, are the niicrobial resistances at a constant sterilization temperature 
and t is therefore the time required to maintain this temperature in order to achieve a 
desired value of P(s). In practice, suitable allowances are made for time at transient 
temperatures i n  a sterilizing range. For present purposes, t can be viewed as repre- 
senting tlic terminal sterilization requirement. 
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The cabow model, and extension tliereof which allow for a wider spectrum of 
impact velocities, are appropriate for operational use in developing specific steriliz- 
tion procedures and controls. 
readily treated in terms of the siniplificd version defined below. 
The subject matter of this paper is, however, more 
j: 
5. POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF RECENT FINDINGS 
A conservative approach to the implementation of the constraint n ( r )  would 
result  i f  the spacecraft impact vclocity, vh, is taken to be larger than the smallest 
s r.1 B crit ical  velocity, vi J , at die individual contamination sources. It will also be 
assumed that microbial destruction i n  transit will be effective only for external surfaces. 
I t  will therefore be convenient to segregate open surfaces into external ones, denoted by 
the superscript ', and internal surfaces, denoted by '. This yields the following 
expressions for n ( r )  in terms of total initial contamination on open and niated surfaces 
and the va-ious factors previously defined: 
I t  is evident from equation 7 that the terms for each source category, i. e. for 
open surfaces, mated surfaces, and buried contamination, must separately be less than 
the quarantine constraint, n (r). Furthermore, that term in equation 7 which is largest  
will necessarily dominate tlie specification of the sterilization time t. 
questions, therefore, relate to which of these source categories represcnts the domimnt 
te rm and whether the dominant term yields the smallest terminal sterilization time. 
The principal 
A 
corollory question is whetlier a preferred te rm could be made dominant. 
a number of controls which might be made a par t  of tlie specification of sterilization pro- 
cedures for the above purpose. 
craft impact velocities and/or the probabilities of their occurrence. Sjmilarly, some 
latitude may be availcable in altering critical velocities of components which may contain 
Figure 1 indicates 
For cxainple, design constraints may be imposed on space- 
- 11- 
large contamination loads, or to improve the velocity attenuation at these sources through 
appropriate design procedures. Another control is that of minimizing the contamination 
~ 
load through the use of clean-rooms and related procedures. 
be useful. However, to justify their use, i t  must be ascertained that they arc contrib- 
uting t o  the reduction of a dominant term in equation 7. 
Some, o r  all of these, may I 
l 
Until recently a conservative estimate was made of the probability of release of 
buried contamination. 
of unity is equivalent to a fracture ratio of about lo6, which implies pulverization of the 
entire spacecraft. This is clearly not a reasonable estimate of conditions which are 
likely to occur. Although work on fracture  ratios of typical spacecraft materials is still 
in progress,  it is evident that the fracture ratio will be significantly lower than that 
implied in earlier estimates. In any event, the probability of release must be less than 
unity by virtue of the fact that the probability of non-nominal landing velocities is less  
than unity. 
In te rms  of the parameters defined herein, a probability of release 
Earlier conservative estimates of microbial release of buried contamination, 
combined with the known higher resistance of such contamination to heat steriliza- 
tion, have made buried contamination the dominant term and, necessarily, led to  a 
relatively stringent terminal sterilization requirement. Referring to the te rms  in the 
parenthesis of equation 7,  it is likely that work now in progress will show the product 
XCCn: 3 ( 0 )  f (vh y: ) to be smaller than n” ( 0 ) .  This would imply a shift towards 
mated contamination as  a basis for defining sterilization requirements. However, to 
benefit from such a shift in any significant way, fl would have to be significantly 
smaller  than DE. 
0 . 3  and 4.4 hours and the upper value is very close to microbial resistance for buried 
Contamination, upon which requirements have been based to date. There is thus a need 
to gain a better understanding of the effects of equilibrium humidity during assembly 
and pressures  at the mated surfaces s o  a s  to permit the setting of the sterilization 
requirement on a value of If closer to 0.3 hours. 
1 3  
For, as noted earlier, current work sets  the value of D” between 
It is also evident from equation 7 that even very low fi-acture ratios and low 
microbial load for buried contamination could not move sterilization procedures to the 
point where only gaseous o r  other non-thermal (or radiation) treatment could be used. 
-12- 
To permit consideration of the latter approaches, a significant change would have to 
occur in the value of n (r),. i. e. either in P(N) o r  P(g). For unless the value of n (r)  
is 011 die order  of unity, o r  larger,  each of the terms on the right side of equation 7 
must be significantly less than unity. This implies sterilizing methods which can be 
relied upon to destroy’all spores  present with a high degree of confidence. 
6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Work currently in progress is focused on the following a reas  of uncertainty: 
(1) the degree of spacecraft equipment fractsiring a t  spacecraft impact velocities, both 
in materials and a t  equipment interfaces, so a s  to obtain more realistic estimates of 
probabilities of microbial release; (2) microbial resistance to heat sterilization a t  
mated surfaces and the physical conditions which will determine its magnitude; and, 
(3) estimation of microbial contarnina tion buried in spacecraft material. 
The above work, combined with suitable controls over mission and spacecraft 
design procedures, may lead to less stringent terminal heat sterilization require- 
ments than had been considered necessary i n  the past. 
values to be specificd for terminal heat sterilization must, however, await the more 
detailed quantification of the various parameters discussed herein; it will at all t imes 
depend upon the values selected for the quarantine goal, namely, the probability 
assigned to the r i sk  of any one landing niission contaminating the planet, and the prob- 
ability estimated for any one viable terrestrial  microorganism spreading and growing 
on the planet surface. 
A determination of the specific 
- 13- 
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